

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 INR-05  
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PRS-01 AF-04 EUR-08 NEA-07 EA-06 EB-03  
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2733

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 0726

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, US, SO, ET, SU, FT, KE, LY, UR

SUBJECT: THE HORN OF AFRICA

1. AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, AMONG THE CLEAREST IMPRESSIONS WHICH I BROUGHT BACK FROM MY TRIP TO AFRICA WAS THE CRITICAL NEED FOR THE USG TO FOCUS ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE HORN OF AFRICA. I HOPE THAT THE FOLLOWING IDEAS ASSIST IN THAT PROCESS:  
THE PLAYERS AND THE PROBLEMS

2. WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO BE EXHAUSTIVE, THE FOLLOWING ATTEMPTS TO SKETCH THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE KEY COUNTRIES IN THE AREA:

A. ETHIOPIA: INSTABILITY HAS BECOME THE DOMINANT  
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FEATURE AND IS LIKELY TO PERSIST FOR SOME TIME. THIS IMPLIES THE POSSIBILITY OF PENDULUM SWINGS IN ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH US AND OTHERS, THE PROBABILITY OF FURTHER DOMESTIC CHAOS AND REPRESSION, AND THE POTENTIAL SPILL-OVER OF THIS DESEQUILIBRIUM AND CHAOS INTO NEIGHBORING LANDS.

B. KENYA: GIVEN SERIOUS PROBLEMS CLOSE AT HAND, IT IS DUBIOUS THAT EVEN THE PRESENT RELATIVELY STABLE GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO GET TOO INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE HORN. IN ADDITION, THE EXAMPLE OF ETHIOPIA WITHOUT HAILE SELASSIE MAY WELL BE REPEATED IN A POST-KENYATTA KENYA -- THE LUOS ARE ALREADY GIRDING FOR PROSPECTIVE MASSACRES AT THE HANDS OF THE KIKUYUS.

C. SOMALIA: SIAD BARRE'S PROTESTATIONS NOTWITHSTANDING, SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA OBVIOUSLY IS SIGNIFICANT. SIMILARLY, AS HE TOLD ME WHEN WE MET, SIAD DREAMS OF A "GREATER SOMALIA", ENCOMPASSING TERRITORIES OF A DISINTEGRATED ETHIOPIA AS WELL AS "FRENCH SOMALILAND." AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET WOOLING OF ETHIOPIA MAY LEAD SOMALIA TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE US.

D. DJIBOUTI: THE PROSPECTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT FTAI (FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS) --EITHER UNDER A KAMIL OR A REVIVIFIED ALI AREF GOVERNMENT--SEEM REMOTE GIVEN INTERNAL WEAKNESSES AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES. THE FRENCH WANT TO BAIL OUT; THE SOMALIS WANT IN; THE ETHIOPIANS WANT, BUT PROBABLY CANNOT OBTAIN, HEGEMONY; AND THE SOVIETS MAY WELL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHAOS IF ONLY TO ATTEMPT TO DENY IT TO THE WEST. A LIKELY PROSPECT IS FOR A SOMALI GRAB, OVERT OR COVERT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIETS AND AT LEAST TACIT APPROVAL OF OTHER ARAB NATIONS.

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E. LIBYA: QADHAFI'S NOT SO FINE HAND IS ALSO STIRRING IN THIS POT WITH THE APPARENT GOAL OF OUSTING NUMAYRI. THIS HAS BROUGHT HIM CLOSE TO SUPPORT OF ETHIOPIA (THOUGH IN THE PAST HE HAS ALSO SIDED WITH THE ERITREANS).

F. SUDAN: SMARTING FROM ATTACKS BY LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA, NUMAYRI HAS ABANDONED HIS PREVIOUSLY MODERATE APPROACH AND APPARENTLY HAS THROWN HIS SUPPORT BEHIND ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE.

3. PROSPECTS IN THE HORN ARE THUS OBVIOUSLY NOT PROMISING, AND THERE IS A REAL DANGER OF SOME SORT OF AN EXPLOSION IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. IN BRIEF, WE FORESEE--  
--FURTHER DISINTEGRATION IN ETHIOPIA;  
--A CONCERTED EFFORT BY MOGADISCIO TO RECALIM SOMALIA IRRIDENTA;  
--SERIOUS INSTABILITY IN KENYA, AND  
--ESCALATIONS OF TENSIONS BETWEEN AND AMONG SUDAN, SOMALIA, LIBYA, AND ETHIOPIA.

4. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE A MAJOR COMMITMENT IN SOMALIA AND, MUCH MORE RECENTLY, GIVEN LIMITED SUPPORT TO ETHIOPIA. THEY ARE UNDOUBTEDLY TEMPTED BY THE PROSPECT OF PLAYING A GREATER ROLE IN THE RED SEA, THE GULF OF ADEN, THE HORN AND THEREBY, THE INDIAN OCEAN. (THEY ALSO MAY BE INTIMIDATED BY THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF THE CHINESE PRESENCE.)

5. OUR TRADITIONAL AFFINITY FOR AND SUPPORT OF ETHIOPIA, THOUGH SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED IN RECENT MONTHS, NEVERTHELESS HAS LEFT THE USG AS THE MAJOR SUPPORTER OF THE EPMG (RECENT SOVIET ADVANCES NOTWITHSTANDING). THIS RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER KEY COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE ON GOOD TERMS WITH THE PRESENT AUTHORITIES IN KENYA.

6. IT IS HARD TO DECIPHER THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES--OTHER THAN WISHING THE WHOLE THING WOULD GO  
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AWAY. THERE IS TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" (E.G., ERITREA) AND "SELF-DETERMINATION" (E.G., FRAI). THERE IS PERSISTENT UNDERCURRENT OF ARAB/AFRICAN HOSTILITY. BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT OTHER AFRICAN STATES WISH TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

DOES IT MATTER?

7. OUR PRINCIPAL INTEREST IN THE HORN WOULD SEEM TO BE THREEFOLD: THE LOGISTICS OF OIL SUPPLIES, THE GENERAL POLITICAL STABILITY OF THE AREA (WITH THE IMPLICATION THIS HOLD FOR CONTINGENT REGIONS SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST), AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN THE HORN ITSELF AND IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. THESE ARE OBVIOUSLY INTERRELATED AND TAKE ON ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF ACTIVE SOVIET COUNTER-INTERESTS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 0726

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8. WITH REGARD TO OIL, OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE RECEIVING MOST OF THEIR SUPPLIES AROUND THE CAPE INSTEAD OF THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL; HOWEVER, ROUGHLY HALF OF OUR MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLIES CONTINUE TO COME THROUGH THE CANAL. THE RED SEA/SUEZ MARITIME ROUTE IS HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO INTERDICTION--BUT EQUALLY VULNERABLE ARE THE SOURCES OF PETROLEUM.

9. WE ARE NOT SERIOUSLY WORRIED THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO DOMINATE THE INDIAN OCEAN WILL SUCCEED--IT IS HARD TO PLAY IN THAT GAME ON ONE SIDE WITHOUT OFFENDING THE OTHER. IN ADDITION, THERE IS THE HOPE FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAVE EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB MODERATES ORIENTED TOWARD THE WEST.

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10 WE DO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO AN AFFECTIVE US PRESENCE IN THE AREA BOTH IN TERMS OF OUR GENERAL POSTURE AS A WORLD POWER AND IN THE HOPE OF BEING AN INFLUENCE TOWARD THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE REA'S PROBLEMS.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

11. AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE ARE FOR THE MOMENT TAGGED AS BEING ON THE SIDE OF ETHIOPIA AND WITH SOMEWHAT DISTANT RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER KEY ACTORS IN THE AREA. GIVEN THE INSTABILITIES OF ETHIOPIA AND OF THE OVER-ALL SITUATION, THIS WOULD SEEM TO US TO BE A USELESS, IF NOT DANGEROUS, POSTURE. ACCORDINGLY, WE RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE

GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING:

A. ETHIOPIA: OUR PREVIOUS SUPPORT OF ETHIOPIA WAS PREDICATED ON HISTORICAL AFFINITY (READ HAILE SELASSIE), THE IMPORTANCE OF KAGNEW FOR OUR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC ACCESS. THAT HAS ALL CHANGED. WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH AN ESSENTIALLY HOSTILE GOVERNMENT, THE PHASING OUT OF KAGNEW, DENIAL OF ACCESS--AND A REPRESSIVE REGIME WHICH DAILY VIOLATES HUMAN RIGHTS. RATHER THAN A BASE FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, ETHIOPIA MUST BE VIEWED NOW AS A SOURCE OF INSTABILITY. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE US SHOULD REDUCE ITS ACTIVITIES IN ETHIOPIA--AID, MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES, OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS--TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO KEEP OUR FOOT IN THE DOOR.

B. SUDAN: WE WOULD URGE THAT SERIOUS EFFORTS BE MADE TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH SUDAN AND TO ENCOURAGE SUDAN TO TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING AN AMENABLE SOLUTION WITHIN THE AREA. SUDAN IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED FOR SUCH A ROLE AS A MULTI-RACIAL STATE WHICH HAS UNDERGONE ITS OWN TRIAL BY FIRE TO ACHIEVE RELATIVE STABILITY AND ONE WHICH HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS AFRICAN NEIGHBORS AND WITH SYRIA, EGYPT, AND SAUDI  
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ARABIA. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THE CASE FOR IMPROVED US" SUDANESE RELATIONS STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS. IN ADDITION, IN ENCOURAGING SUDAN TO TAKE MORE INITIATIVE, WE COULD EMPHASIZE THE DANGERS OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY RATHER THAN IMPLYING ANY WISH FOR A CLIENT STATE RELATIONSHIP. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE INSTABILITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING ON SUDAN COULD UNDERMINE SUCH AN EFFORT. BUT AT THE MOMENT WE BELIEVE THAT SUDAN OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT FOR HELPING TO CREATE A STABILITY IN THE AREA.

C. KENYA: AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE DO NOT SEE KENYA PLAYING A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE HORN AND ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF FUTURE DOMESTIC INSTABILITY. OUR PRESENT POSTURE WITH REGARD TO KENYA SEEMS THEREFORE APPROPRIATE.

D. SOMALIA: WHILE CHANCES SEEM SLIGHT, WE SHOULD REMAIN ALERT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY POSSIBLE REORIENTATION OF THEIR POLICY FOLLOWING SOVIET INITIATIVES IN ETHIOPIA.

12. FROM THE ABOVE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IN OUR VIEW SUDAN SHOULD BE THE KEY TO OUR FUTURE EFFORTS IN THE HORN. IN OUR INFORMAL CONTACTS, SUDANESE AT THE UN HAVE LONG SUGGESTED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY OUR MYOPIC ATTENTION TO ETHIOPIA AND WOULD WELCOME

OVERTURES TO THEM.

13. THE UPCOMING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF  
SUDANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MANSOUR KHALID PROVIDES US WITH  
AN IDEAL OCCASION TO EXPLORE SUCH AN INITIATIVE.  
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## Message Attributes

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